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James Magee9 
On the afternoon before he died in Florida's electric chair, se-
rial murderer Ted Bundy was interviewed by James Dobson, a psy-
chologist and broadcaster based in Pomona, California, and an 
erstwhile member of the Attorney General's Commission on Por-
nography. During this unusual interview, Bundy linked his patho-
logical life to violent, hard-core pornography. Had Attorney 
General Edwin Meese been attuned to Nancy Reagan's astrological 
source of timing, he might have postponed the release of the Final 
Report of his commission to coincide with the public attention that 
I. Syndicated columnist. 
2. Editorial director of Forum. 
3. Senior editor of Forum. 
4. Professor of Communications, University of California, Santa Barbara. 
5. Professor of Psychology, University of California at Los Angeles. 
6. Associate Professor of Psychology, University of Wisconsin at Madison. 
7. Professor of Law, University of Southern California. 
8. Associate Professor of Philosophy, St. John's University in Minnesota. 
9. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Delaware. 
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visited the execution of the deranged Bundy. Instead, that docu-
ment was made public in July, 1986, and, predictably, was greeted 
by intense controversy. 
In 1970, the only other presidential commission charged with a 
similar task-appraising the effects of pornography on anti-social 
conduct-had reached quite different but equally controversial con-
clusions. Chaired by Dean William B. Lockhart of the University 
of Minnesota Law School, that earlier commission concluded that 
exposure to explicit sexual materials could not be significantly cor-
related with anti-social behavior and hence recommended the repeal 
of all laws proscribing the sale of pornography to consenting adults. 
The Lockhart Commission report was roundly condemned by reli-
gious leaders, by the president himself, and (sixty-five to five) by the 
United States Senate. 
Sixteen years later, the Meese Commission documented a sig-
nificant link between violent pornography and aggression against 
women. This conclusion, however, received little publicity and was 
largely submerged in a torrent of predictable reactions from, on one 
side, libertarian critics who dismissed the Final Report as a silly, 
tendentious enterprise conducted for political purposes, and, on the 
other side, equally dogmatic conservatives who indiscriminately 
supported censorship. As with the Lockhart Commission, the poli-
tics of pornography precluded a judicious response to the Commis-
sion's conclusions. 
I 
Since 1957, censorship of pornography has been one of the 
most difficult ("intractable," in the view of Justice Harlan) constitu-
tional problems. Spanning the juridical range from Justice Hugo L. 
Black's ostensibly carefree "absolutism" to the painstaking case-by-
case application of uncertain standards and definitions of obscenity 
and pornography, the Justices have labored diligently in this field 
without satisfying liberals, conservatives, or legal scholars. 
To begin with, the Court has never provided a satisfactory jus-
tification for withdrawing constitutional protection from this form 
of expression. It has merely asserted that the first amendment was 
not intended to protect pornography, a proposition that does not 
distinguish it from libel, and that porn has no redeeming social 
value, a contention that-even if true-does not distinguish some 
other forms of protected speech. The Court has never officially rec-
ognized any alternative explanation for denying constitutional pro-
tection-such as the feminist theory that pornography perpetuates 
discrimination, and even violence, against women. 
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The Court's pornography holdings can be reduced essentially 
to two phases: implementation of the Warren Court's Roth test 
(1957 -1969) and the Burger-Rehnquist Courts' reformulated test 
announced in Miller and applied from 1973 to the present. Without 
expressly ruling on the matter, prior to 1957 the Justices had always 
assumed that pornography was unprotected expression. In Roth v. 
United States (1957) the Court squarely held that such expression 
was beyond the pale of the first amendment. The Roth opinion tried 
to define this unprotected expression with a test that plagued the 
Court for over a decade. The issue, said the Court, is whether "to 
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to 
prurient interest." Such material, said the Court, is undeserving of 
constitutional protection because it has no redeeming social value. 
Whether the material created a "clear and present danger" of anti-
social conduct was deemed an irrelevant inquiry; that test, the Jus-
tices said, applies only to protected types of speech. 
The unrewarding job of explaining what Roth meant cast the 
Court in the following ten years in the humiliating role of screening 
sexually oriented films, books, magazines, and photographs in hope-
less efforts to ascertain who was the "average person," what were 
"contemporary community standards," whether "prurient interest" 
was aroused, and whether this movie or that book had any redeem-
ing social value. While the Court seemed highly sympathetic to de-
fendants' arguments in the pornography cases of that period, no 
observer could possibly explain case results without reference to the 
idiosyncratic views of the individual Justices. One could hardly 
ever discover an "opinion of the Court." Thoroughly unable to 
agree as to any appropriate constitutional rationale, the Court in a 
1967 per curiam opinion acknowledged the legal disorder. Explain-
ing the range of views among the brethren, the Court reversed con-
victions in three cases with this un-lawyer-like statement: 
"Whichever of these constitutional views is brought to bear upon 
the cases before us, it is clear that the judgments cannot stand." 
Thereafter, the Court repaired to routine summary reversal of gen-
eral obscenity convictions that did not implicate any of three valid 
state interests that apparently appealed to a majority of the Justices: 
concern for juveniles, the privacy of unconsenting individuals, and 
restraint against commercial "pandering." 
Thus it seemed the Court was indirectly demanding a stronger 
justification for suppression than pornography's power to excite 
lust. In a rare demonstration of solidarity in this realm, the Court 
in Stanley v. Georgia (1969) seemed implicitly to reject the idea that 
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pornography is generally harmful, even though continuing to assert 
that Roth remained good law: "We hold that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of ob-
scene material a crime." Roth and its legacy, the opinion claimed, 
dealt only with commercial distribution of pornography. 
Yet the reasoning in Stanley hardly comports with the founda-
tions of Roth. For example, Stanley maintained that the "right to 
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is 
fundamental to our free society." Stanley quoted from Winters v. 
New York (1948), where the Court had invalidated state regulation 
of commercial distribution of certain crime magazines because 
"although we can see nothing of any possible value to society in 
these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free 
speech as the best of literature .... " Yet Roth had quite clearly 
ignored Winters by assuming that pornography is unprotected pre-
cisely because it is "utterly without redeeming social value." Re-
sponding to the state's claim that it had authority to protect an 
individual's mind from the effects of pornography, the Stanley 
Court exclaimed that such an "assertion ... is wholly inconsistent 
with the philosophy of the First Amendment." Suddenly the first 
amendment was applicable to pornography, and the pillars holding 
up Roth seemed to collapse, despite the Court's unpersuasive effort 
to distinguish that case. 
Reacting to the state's final argument, that exposure to pornog-
raphy may induce anti-social conduct, the Court, in another depar-
ture from Roth, conceded that such a rationale for regulation might 
be valid, but concluded that "there appears to be little empirical 
basis for that assertion." In the context of private possession, how-
ever, Stanley (quoting Brandeis's opinion in Whitney v. California) 
indicated that even if such a connection could be established, 
"among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent 
crimes are education and punishment for violators of the law," not 
suppression of speech. 
The Court's per curiam orders reversing convictions based on 
general anti-pornography laws paralleled the 1970 commission's 
recommendation to repeal these laws. Both the Court and the com-
mission recognized legitimate governmental interests in keeping 
pornography from children and from unconsenting adults who 
found it offensive, while rejecting all justifications for total 
suppressiOn. 
The political objection to this disposition eventually led to doc-
trinal changes. The membership of the Court had changed between 
1969 and 1971, when the Court reversed its position and upheld the 
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general suppression of pornography in three cases. By 1971, Presi-
dent Nixon had replaced four of the nine Justices, and in Miller v. 
California (1973) a sharply-divided (5-4) Court announced a new 
set of standards: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to prurient interest ... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in 
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value. 
These "community standards," said the Court, were not uniform, 
national criteria, but rather the local standards of the various com-
munities within which prosecutions for pornography would take 
place. 
Miller signaled a shift in the Court's stance, but the ambiguity 
of the Court's standards left plenty of room for interpretation: 
phrases like "serious ... value" and "patently offensive" were too 
abstract to furnish much guidance. This became painfully clear a 
year later when the Court unanimously reversed a state criminal 
conviction for showing the award-winning movie Carnal Knowl-
edge, which apparently had been deemed patently offensive under 
the community standards of Albany, Georgia. 
Later, elaborating the content of "prurient interest," the Court 
in another case explained that it applies only to "sexual responses 
over and beyond those that would be characterized as normal." 
Lust was now a constitutionally acceptable reaction to pornogra-
phy, if manifested in "only normal, healthy sexual desires," which, 
presumably, elderly judges were prepared to discern. to In yet an-
other case, the Court emphatically stated that the "literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value" factor in Miller could not be calibrated 
in terms of varying community standards. In a separate opinion, 
freshman Justice Antonin Scalia thought that this turn of events 
warranted a reconsideration of Miller: "Just as there is no arguing 
about taste, there is no use litigating about it. For the law courts to 
decide 'What is Beauty' is a novelty even by today's standards." 
II 
The Miller standards did not obviate the need for unseemly 
and burdensome case-by-case judicial review of pornography deci-
sions. Indeed, some features of Miller are perhaps more nebulous 
than the Roth test. Yet the twists and turns of constitutional doc-
10. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc .. 472 U.S. 491. 498 (1985). 
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trines about pornography may be less important than several nonle-
gal developments. Of these, the most fundamental-and ironic-is 
the fact that, despite the brakes applied in Miller, hard-core pornog-
raphy has proliferated. Apparently, the Court's volte face closed 
the barn door after the horses had escaped. The difficulty of ob-
taining convictions under general obscenity statutes was not re-
duced by the Miller modifications; laissez-faire seems to have 
survived in fact, though not in law, as pornography has become a 
multi-billion dollar industry, infiltrated substantially by organized 
cnme. 
Instead of trying to prohibit pornography through protracted, 
troublesome, and often unsuccessful criminal prosecutions, many 
local governments have resorted to their zoning powers. Ordina-
rily, such "time, place, and manner" regulations, when applied to 
constitutionally protected expression, must be content-neutral. The 
government can, of course, go to court to prosecute legally obscene 
materials; but the goal of zoning is to avoid litigation over border-
line cases, and instead to lump together all "adult" expression, re-
gardless of whether it could constitutionally be proscribed. Over 
the objection of dissenting Justices, the Court has occasionally re-
laxed its requirement of content neutrality, to accommodate zoning 
schemes designed to cope with a rising tide of pornographic materi-
als.tt This approach has appealed to numerous jurisdictions, no 
doubt because it is less replete with the legal problems that attend 
direct, and apparently futile, attempts to suppress pornography. 
Another development has been the increase of violence in pho-
tographs, magazines, films, and videotapes in which sexual preoc-
cupations are either explicitly or implicitly featured. Rampant 
aggression against women has been crafted into a new genre of vis-
ual expression, in the form principally of "slasher" films, for exam-
ple Toolbox Murders, in which a naked woman masturbates in a 
bathtub and then is killed by a man with a power drill. These inex-
plicably alluring films are not necessarily pornographic under the 
Roth or Miller standards; they tend not to include explicit depic-
tions of genitalia, and are therefore "R-rated" instead of "X-rated." 
Meanwhile, the pornography issue has been reshaped by a 
revolution in technology. Cable television and video players have 
encouraged the growth of sexually oriented representations in the 
mass media. Federal regulations prohibit the showing of X-rated 
films on cable television, but violent "slasher" films like The Texas 
Chain Saw Massacre are commonly aired. This raises a host of 
II. See, e.g .. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
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problems, such as the justification for stricter regulations of the con-
tent of broadcasting, as compared to print, media. 
Finally, attitudes toward pornography have been affected by 
feminist writings, and particularly the theory that pornography 
helps to perpetuate male supremacy. 
When the Lockhart Commission published its findings in 1970, 
these sociological developments had scarcely begun. The Meese 
Commission, on the other hand, undertook its investigations within 
a socio-political environment that was much more conducive to 
pro-regulation conclusions. 
Ideology never fully vacates any field of social inquiry, and the 
1986 commission could not escape ideological division. In some 
ways, in fact, the origins, as well as the assignments, of that com-
mission betray preconceived conclusions. In May, 1984, President 
Reagan in his re-election year called for the establishment of such a 
commission. Whereas the earlier panel had been furnished with a 
healthy budget of $2,000,000 and given sufficient time to conduct 
original empirical research, the Meese Commission was charged 
with a twelve-month mission and only allotted $400,000 (more than 
$6 million in 1985 dollars would have been needed to match the 
budget of 1970). Perhaps this helps to explain why critics were gen-
erally predisposed to dismiss the entire enterprise as nothing more 
than a political maneuver by the Reagan administration. 
The Meese Commission divided sexually oriented expression 
into four categories. The first embodies sexual scenes with explicit 
violence in which women are ultimately shown deriving pleasure 
from this violence-raped women brought to orgasm, for example. 
The second, and probably the largest commercial category, was 
considered nonviolent, but degrading or humiliating insofar as wo-
men are depicted as subservient to the sexual pleasures of men. The 
third comprises explicit displays of various forms of non-degrading, 
"consensual and equal" sexual intercourse. The fourth consists of 
unprovocative nudity without strong sexual overtones. 
The Commission tried to weigh the harmful impact of each of 
these kinds of expression on three scales: 1) hard, scientific, experi-
mental evidence; 2) the totality of the available evidence (including 
the testimony of witnesses who appeared before the Commission); 
and 3) moral, ethical, and cultural considerations. 
The Commission's conclusions can be succinctly stated: sexu-
ally violent and degrading materials (the first and second classes) 
tend to promote aggression toward women; expressions of consen-
sual and equal sexual behavior, as well as simple nudity, on the 
other hand, are not harmful unless children are involved. Some 
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members, such as Dr. James Dobson (who interviewed Ted Bundy), 
regarded graphic presentations of sex as per se degrading and thus 
harmful, but the Final Report itself did not adopt this theory; it 
recommended, not new laws, but that existing regulations be more 
conscientiously enforced. 
The Commission found statistically reliable social science data 
to support the proposition that violent depictions of sex are harm-
ful. Concerning the second type of materials (scenes of degrada-
tion, humiliation, domination, or subservience), the Commission's 
evidence was concededly sketchy and "tentative," and the conclu-
sions of harm were drawn "with somewhat less" assurance than the 
unanimous judgment about violent pornography. But even this 
documented connection between violence and aggression toward 
women was obscured by the chorus of ridicule that greeted the Fi-
nal Report. The Commission surely, if inadvertently, encouraged 
exactly this reception in resorting to "moral, ethical, and cultural" 
criteria in assessing social harm. With a Commission as obviously 
stacked as this one, such patently subjective and conservative-
sounding criteria were a red flag to commentators whose ideology 
differed from that of the commissioners. 
In United States of America vs. Sex, Nobile and Nadler capital-
ize on the obvious vulnerabilities of a presidential commission 
charged by a conservative administration with the duty of defining 
pornography and assessing its ramifications when loosed upon a 
modern, pluralist society. No serious reader would treat their book 
as a scholarly response to the Commission's conclusions. Indeed, 
the bias of these authors is as blatant as the bias they attribute to 
nearly every member of the Commission. The sardonic grind of 
their narrative does not let up, even temporarily to recount the testi-
mony of pitiful victims of sexual abuse. Nevertheless, the book does 
offer an amusing tale of the tribulations of the Meese Commission. 
In a very sobering and scholarly volume, Professor Edward 
Donnerstein, an important witness for the Meese Commission, and 
Professors Daniel Linz and Steven Penrod, who collaborated in 
compiling the work in The Question of Pornography, corroborate 
with repeated and substantial experimental research, the most im-
portant and the only scientifically persuasive finding of the Final 
Report-that depictions of sexual violence do contribute to aggres-
sion against women. The impetus behind their book was "that so 
much attention was being paid to the possibly damaging conse-
quences of exposure to pornography that the more pervasive and 
more troubling combination of sex and aggression in the media 
were being ignored. We contend that violence against women in 
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some types of R-rated films shown in neighborhood theaters and on 
cable TV far exceeds that portrayed in even the most graphic 
pornography." 
This book not only comprehensively reviews the experiments 
and findings of other researchers but also describes original labora-
tory experiments undertaken by the authors to test the validity of 
earlier works and popular assumptions. The first chapter in-
troduces the reader to the methodology of social-psychological ex-
periments designed to measure whether exposure to certain stimuli 
causes certain human behavioral reactions. The familiar criticisms 
of scientific laboratory attempts to discern causality are candidly 
acknowledged, yet the most prominent-and standard-objections 
raised by the critics seem persuasively countered by Donnerstein et 
a!., though they conclude the chapter by saying that readers, after 
having read the caveats, should formulate their own assessment. 
Research findings (as well as the critical and political re-
sponses) produced by the 1970 pornography commission are dis-
cussed at length in the next chapter which concludes with the 
recognition that much of the sexually oriented material saturating 
the market today is very different from that which was prevalent in 
1970. 
Unlike many feminist critics of pornography, the authors of 
this book conclude "that the data, overall, do not support the con-
tention that exposure to nonviolent pornography has significant ad-
verse effects." This corresponds to the general assessment made by 
the 1970 presidential commission. Moreover, contrary to one of the 
conclusions (one not based on scientific data) of the Meese Commis-
sion, Donnerstein eta!. argue that "evidence supporting the conten-
tion that so-called degrading [but not violent] pornographic 
materials ... are harmful is sparse and inconsistent." 
A very different appraisal follows experiments with violent 
pornography which conveys the message that women find force or 
aggression pleasurable. This message seems to influence male per-
ceptions and attitudes about rape, though the evidence suggests 
"that exposure to aggressive pornography is not necessarily 'caus-
ing' calloused attitudes about rape, but rather reinforcing and 
strengthening already existing beliefs and values." Laboratory ex-
periments demonstrate that "normal college age males [the usual 
subjects] become sexually aroused to violent pornography, espe-
cially if it contains the message that women enjoy being raped." 
Although violence in adult oriented materials has become 
more prominent since 1970, this trend is due to violence in R-rated 
movies in which no explicit sex is shown. Moreover, as one major 
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study has demonstrated, in X-rated films and videotapes (tradition-
ally defined as pornographic because sexual activity is explicitly 
presented), levels of violence have decreased while scenes of "mu-
tual" and "egalitarian" sex have become more common. 
Donnerstein, Linz, and Penrod ask the inevitable question: is 
it the sex or is it the violence that is significantly correlated with 
aggressive attitudes and behavior toward women? The scientific ev-
idence appears to point the finger at the violence. Furthermore, the 
idea that women desire rape is "so pervasive in our culture that it is 
myopic" to call it "the exclusive domain of violent pornography." 
In fact, the most violent depictions-the "slasher" and "splatter" 
films-are the most readily available; they can be found across the 
country in drive-in movies and regularly on cable TV. Research 
studies "strongly suggest that violence against women need not oc-
cur in a pornographic or sexually explicit context to have a negative 
effect on viewer attitudes and behavior." "The important point is 
that much of the evidence for stating that sexually violent pornogra-
phy is harmful (i.e., leads to calloused attitudes and perceptions) is 
based upon materials that probably are not sexually explicit enough 
to be judged obscene by most standards." 
To focus concern primarily on pornographic images of violence 
against women is therefore misguided. The main problem lies else-
where. According to at least one laboratory study, even women 
themselves, when repeatedly exposed to nonpornographic slasher 
films, become desensitized to violence against women. 
Moreover, the rating system utilized by the motion picture in-
dustry yields a bizarre irony: People under 18 years of age are for-
bidden to view X-rated films, even those without violence, yet films 
with far less restrictive ratings, to which they do have access, fre-
quently contain nonexplicit but very violent sexual messages of rape 
and other aggression against women. "The message to young peo-
ple in our society may be that sexual violence is permissible, but 
nonviolent sexual relations are not." 
If these generalizations are not wildly off the mark, it appears 
that the Supreme Court's preoccupation with "patent depictions of 
sexual conduct" is largely irrelevant to the pressing concerns of the 
contemporary debate about pornography and social harm. In this 
respect, the Meese Commission was ahead of the Court: though 
some of its panelists were fixated principally on explicit genital in-
teraction, the Final Report recognized the mounting and greater 
danger in "slasher" and "splatter" depictions of violence. 
Donnerstein, Linz, and Penrod do not recommend renewed ef-
forts to suppress violent expression, even when it is sexually ex-
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plicit. They caution that the evidence of harm is drawn only from 
laboratory experiments. As an alternative to censorship, they sug-
gest education ("debriefing") as the most efficacious and responsible 
way to cope with materials by which they admittedly are "person-
ally and morally deeply offended." In this respect, they disagree 
with the Meese Commission. 
The slasher genre of pathological eroticism is a big business 
and is readily available in the mass media market, especially via 
broadcasting, a medium that is legally more susceptible to federal 
regulation than are other forms of mass communication. Matthew 
L. Spitzer's Seven Dirty Words and Six Other Stories develops an 
argument designed to undermine the traditional legal distinction 
between regulation of print and of broadcast, a distinction that he 
regards as "the central anomaly" of the system of freedom of ex-
pression in the United States. 
Spitzer summarizes the three principal arguments ordinarily 
advanced to defend the federal government's greater regulation of 
broadcasting: "(1) to achieve economic efficiency; (2) to limit sexu-
ally harmful conduct caused by people's exposure to sexually ex-
plicit or violent material; and (3) to prevent children's exposure to a 
variety of material that may cause them harm." In Part I of this 
book he demolishes each of the various economic rationales for the 
print-broadcast distinction. Nor does he find adequate justifications 
for governmentally imposed levels of access and diversity in broad-
casting, regulations ostensibly designed, according to an argument 
that Spitzer destroys, to promote the values of the first amendment. 
Part II deals with the impact on viewers of sexually explicit 
and/or violent expression disseminated through radio and televi-
sion, particularly with respect to accessibility of these materials to 
children. Many have assumed that broadcasting, especially televi-
sion, is extraordinarily persuasive. Spitzer believes that the evi-
dence in support of this proposition is at best contradictory and 
inconclusive; there is "no general difference between persuasion in 
print and in broadcasting that will support differential regulation of 
content." 
Confronting next the sensitive topic of sexually explicit 
presentations, he recognizes the "strong intuition that film is more 
arousing than print," but he contends that the available research 
does not support that supposition. If anything, the evidence tends 
to show that print may be slightly more potent than video and film. 
At any rate, "the evidence regarding bad effects of sexually explicit 
materials on adults cannot justify differential regulation of print and 
broadcast." 
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When he discusses violence on television, Spitzer's position be-
comes more ambiguous, because there are studies that document 
undesirable effects of violent broadcasting. He admits that the 
greater accessibility of TV violence to children "might suggest 
stricter regulation of broadcast than of print," such as channeling 
or segregating that material into certain frequencies or times of the 
day. That is all he will concede. 
There are at least two important problems with this analysis. 
One problem is that uniform treatment of the media would not nec-
essarily lead to deregulation; it could just as logically lead to con-
tent regulations of books and newspapers, at least when the subject 
matter involves violence. Another problem emerges from Spitzer's 
chapter examining the effects of sexually explicit materials on ag-
gressive behavior. Like many other investigators, Spitzer finds no 
solid data to support the assumption that graphic sexual depictions 
encourage aggressive conduct; he thus finds, on this front, no reason 
to regulate broadcasting differently. Unlike other researchers, how-
ever, Spitzer does not appear to include slasher and splatter films in 
arriving at this assessment; yet, as noted earlier, this bizarre genre 
has been frequently and significantly linked with the reinforcement 
of calloused attitudes toward victims of rape and other aggression. 
Perhaps the most divisive issue in the contemporary debate is 
whether pornography degrades and helps to subjugate women. 
Conceivably, under its powers to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment, Congress could proscribe pornography as a reasonable means 
of eliminating, or at least reducing, sex discrimination. 12 
Whether a statute could be drafted along these lines that the 
Court would uphold despite its rejection of the feminist ordinance 
that Indianapolis adopted, is unclear. Although the Final Report of 
the Meese Commission repeatedly quotes Andrea Dworkin to the 
effect that pornography is an instrument of male domination, 
hardly any empirically persuasive evidence exists to support the no-
tion that nonviolent, but sexually explicit, portrayals of women as 
objects of men's pleasure actually encourages aggression against 
women or makes denigration of women socially acceptable. 
Although most feminists are rightly critical of depictions of vi-
olence perpetrated against women, the rage of radical feminists has 
at times been directed against heterosexuality itself. For example, 
Alison Jaggar has written: "From the radical feminist perspective 
12. The constitutionality of such federal legislation could be derived from the combina-
tion of arguments developed by the Supreme Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 
(1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 
U.S. 409 (1968). 
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... most heterosexual relations are indistinguishable from rape."u 
Before assuming her duties as advisor to the cities of Indianapolis 
and Minneapolis, Dworkin postulated that even male homosexual-
ity insults women, because one of the men, according to Dworkin, 
usually plays the subservient, dominated "female" role. She also 
voiced the unusual conclusion that heterosexuality is an acceptable 
practice only if the man's penis is not erect. 
If pornography is the ideology of male supremacy, it seems to 
be remarkably ineffective. Coinciding with the tremendous explo-
sion of the pornography industry in the last twenty years has been 
the emergence and success of the women's movement, including un-
precedented judicial dismantling of archaic laws unfairly discrimi-
nating against women and the creation of new and sweeping state 
and federal legislation designed to increase equality of the sexes. In 
previous eras, when pornography was relatively hard to obtain, pa-
triarchy was much more secure. 
In the most provocative and intellectually complex book re-
viewed here, Professor Alan Soble confronts pornography, 
feminism (including its compelling, as well as its implausible, con-
tributions), and Marxism. He explores the possibility of what he 
regards as a better world: a communist society that, unlike existing 
Marxist regimes, is replete with pornography. In the preface he 
gives evidence of the pervasive nature of sex in society, at least from 
his point of view: 
I have been walking about in a daze of scholarly sexuality, in a world eroticized in a 
peculiarly Platonic way: mocked simultaneously by genital stirrings and philosoph-
ical amazement, stimulated by ubiquitous beauty into urges analytically perverse 
and perversely analytic. How did Ellis, Freud, and Kinsey survive? ... The pro-
cess was strenuous ... because studying Marxist accounts of sexuality, feminist 
critiques, and pornography itself forced me almost daily to wonder about my own 
sexuality. Now, with the long-delayed orgasm of publication at hand, I want only 
to relax, to curl up with a good book that contains not the merest sexual innuendo. 
Fat chance. Even Descartes on mind and body feels different these days. 
His two major theoretical obstacles are the orthodox Marxist 
view that pornography is a pathological derivative of capitalism and 
the radical feminist conviction that it is the propaganda of patri-
archy. Applying Marxist themes in a field in which Marxists have 
been notably quiet, Soble's essay is a defense of pornography as de-
sirable in a nonsexist, communist society. Unlike some liberal dog-
matists who find nothing but subjective "blue-nosed" repression in 
any effort to circumscribe pornographic expression, Soble is careful 
to recognize that some contemporary pornography is undoubtedly 
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and unrelentingly designed to degrade and humiliate women. On 
the other hand, unlike those feminists who attack biology, he can-
didly avows that sexuality, including erect penises, is healthy, and 
can be enjoyed by both sexes, as can pornographic representations 
of this sexuality. And, finally, unlike most Marxists who regard 
prostitution and pornography as products of the decadent capitalist 
society, and who predict the disappearance of both when commu-
nism prevails, Soble is confident that pornography, in a communist 
society, "will neither wither away nor be degrading." 
The traditional Marxist urge to treat pornography as a social 
dysfunction rests on bourgeois perceptions of (or Victorian aver-
sions to) sexuality. Orthodox Marxist assumptions considered users 
of i;ornography as displaced, disordered, or deprived men, retreat-
ing to dingy, dark theaters or their attics to masturbate. This devi-
ant behavior would vanish in the communist society that would 
displace the oppressive weight of capitalism and all its ugly manifes-
tations of alienation: prostitution, pornography, promiscuity, mas-
turbation, and homosexuality, according to Wilhelm Reich, whose 
Freudian-Marxist thought Soble assesses in Chapter 2. 
For Reich, capitalist relations of production repress sexuality, 
and therefore the elimination of capitalism would dispose of re-
pressed sexuality in all of its supposedly deviant expressions. Marx 
believed that pornography was a product of economic coercion, and 
Freud contributed the notion that sexual repression generates the 
desire for pornography. Soble dismisses Reich's comprehension of 
natural human sexuality as too narrow: "it does not differ apprecia-
bly from the standard Roman Catholic view: genital heterosexual-
ity is the natural form of human sexuality." 
Because of the suppressive nature of capitalism, however, we 
cannot really know what the nature of sexuality really is until capi-
talism is supplanted and men and women are free to be themselves. 
This is the "agnosticism" of Frederick Engels from which Soble 
heavily borrows to deflate Reich's epistemological assumptions. 
Reich simply cannot know whether promiscuity, homosexuality, 
pornography, and so forth, are acts of repressed sexuality until gen-
eral repression caused by the social condition is removed. This 
"view that human nature will express itself when people are free is 
so typically liberal that it is surprising to find it in Engels." But it is 
a premise that is indispensable to the first stage of Soble's argument. 
"Because the world has not yet experienced the new modes of pro-
duction that constitute socialist and then communist society, there 
is no firm empirical basis on which to make reliable predictions 
about the desires and actions that these future relations of produc-
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tion will generate. All such counterfactuals of the sort asserted or 
presupposed by the Reichian framework are as futile and as un-
scientific as astrology." 
Soble can thus liberate himself from Reich's rather narrow 
comprehension of sexuality, but Soble's Achilles heel is the same as 
Reich's: if we in a noncommunist society do not and cannot know 
what we, as free people, would really want, logically it is impossible 
to know if what we already have is, indeed, contrary to what we 
would want. Soble tries to circumvent this dilemma by simply as-
serting that "a Marxist historical view of human nature allows us to 
predict with some reliability that pornography will exist in commu-
nist society and that both its production and consumption will serve 
valuable functions, [though] I think it wise to avoid specifying all 
the content of that pornography." 
Soble's speculations are often very plausible, deriving from re-
alistic observations about male and female sexuality and how the 
division of labor under capitalism has intensified the inequality that 
might account for both the content of most modern pornography 
and men's use of it. In Soble's utopia, unburdened by the yoke of 
capitalism and the dullness of work, men and women will be freed 
from the repressive sexuality that is now imposed upon them; like 
the theater, pornography will become "sophisticated spectator en-
joyment" to be appreciated by all the senses made full and free in a 
communist society. A completely liberated sexuality, he surmises, 
might also encourage experimentation with bisexuality. 
Soble argues that the sprawling women's movement has been 
searching for a rallying cry that can cohere the divergent, and often 
contradictory, forces within. "Pornography becomes the central 
feminist issue in the same way that prostitution was the central is-
sue in the late nineteenth century .... An explanation for the pro-
gressive vehemence of the feminist protest is now available: as the 
women's movement failed to attain its desired unification, and as 
issue after issue either created more internal dissension or was un-
able to produce unity, the need for an indisputable focus became 
stronger." 
Pornography became a unifying issue because it was an easy 
target. Rape used to be the target, but it could not mobilize enough 
women, especially "right-wing" white women who suspected that 
many rape victims, by their "indecent" behavior, "asked for" rape, 
and who tended to have little sympathy for black women (who, 
compared to white women, are disproportionately raped). Contem-
porary pornography, however, solidifies the movement by attracting 
these right-wing women who are offended by its contents and also 
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by excluding liberal men "who profess feminist ideals but who back 
down when the ideals beat on their bedroom doors." 
But if the women's movement, trumpeted with bra-burning 
and other symbolic protest, could not unsettle the cosmetics indus-
try, "it will never be able to make a dent in rape or pornography." 
Pornography is essentially a natural expression of human sexuality 
that will always exist. 
Contrary to the radical feminists, Soble believes that, "Men use 
pornography as compensation for their dire lack of power; pornog-
raphy is therefore not so much an expression of male power as it is 
an expression of their lack of power." The women's movement has 
been, in part, and especially since the mid-1970s, an attempt to lib-
erate women from the obligation of accommodating male sexuality. 
As this movement has succeeded in changing the attitudes and be-
havior of many women, men have turned to "pornographic fantasy 
in which their sexual desires are satisfied by fully accommodating 
women." Told by their radical sisters that men's erections are re-
volting reminders of subjugation and degradation, and torn by nor-
mal heterosexual attraction to men and their awakened aversion to 
humiliation which they find in some pornography, some women re-
fuse to accommodate and some men attempt to recoup a sense of 
lost power through masturbation facilitated by pornography. 
If this is true, why then would pornography hold any appeal in 
an egalitarian communist society? If power were restored to men, 
or made equally available to both sexes, would not pornography (as 
a substitute for lost power) disappear? Soble's answer is that sexu-
ality is a normal and permanent attribute of life, and pornography 
has been an ever present manifestation of it. In a communist soci-
ety, it will not disappear; it will instead be satisfying to both sexes-
free, natural, and not degrading to anybody. "An obsessive interest 
in sexuality will vanish when people engage in self-satisfying labor 
and when full development of their capacities is no longer prevented 
by an oppressive division of labor. Sex will then occupy its own 
place in the rich lives of people who are happy in their work and 
who do not need to elevate in importance one aspect of that life to 
the detriment of others. In the full day of the communist person 
described by Marx in The German Ideology, sex and love and 
whatever else will fit nicely among doing philosophy, writing music, 
and hoeing the field." 
It's a pleasant prospect. 
